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TALBERT v. REEVES

"[Ilt is perfectly clear that an unloaded pistol,
when used in the manner shown by the evidence in
this case, is not, in fact, a dangerous weapon. If the
defendant had struck or attempted to strike with it,
the question whether it was or was not a dangerous
weapon in the manner used, or attempted to be used,
would be one of fact; but the courts quite uniformly
hold as a matter of law that an unloaded pistol, when
there is no attempt to use it otherwise than by pointing
it in a threatening manner at another, is not a dangerous weapon."8 3
With the presumption that a firearm so used is loaded,
which is already followed by the great majority of robbery
cases, and even by the Wisconsin cases, as indicated in the
opinion of the principal case, 84 it might well be argued that
the approach of the assault cases could be followed in the
robbery cases with more justice than lies in the "possibility" approach above described. There would be greater
consistency obtained in the two lines of cases, which seem
to be dealing with essentially the same problem.
SAMUEL LYLS FnLAND

Removal Of Administrator Because Of
Conflicting Interests
Talbert v. Reeves1
The wife of an intestate, after qualifying as his administratrix,2 filed her personal claim against the estate for services rendered to the intestate's business for the sixteen
years prior to the decedent's death. The two surviving
sisters of the intestate thereupon filed exceptions demanding due proof of this claim and further alleged that a substantial portion of this claim was barred by the statute of
limitations.' Counsel for the administratrix made a motion
to strike out these exceptions on the grounds that the defense of limitations was not available to the exceptants,
and that they were not entitled to call for full proof since
that was a matter solely between the court and the adminisIbid, 952.
Supra, n. 30, 115.
1211 Md. 275, 127 A. 2d 533 (1956), di8. op. 283.
'MD. CODE (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 22.
'MD. CoDE (1951) Art. 57, Sec. 1.
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tratrix. Upon this the sisters filed a petition to remove the
administratrix on the ground that he was not acting for
the best interests of the estate, but was advancing her own
individual interests. The Orphan's Court revoked her letters and from this she appealed.
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower court's
decision, held: that in view of the fact that the administratrix had a legal right to file a claim against the estate in
her charge,' the mere fact that she was unable to raise the
defense of limitations against her own claim did not furnish a ground for her removal. From this holding there
was a vigorous dissent by Special Judge George Henderson.
This case is one of first impression in Maryland to the
extent that the sole ground upon which removal was sought
was that of the conflicting interest of the administratrix.
Certainly the court was aware that such a conflict of interest did exist. Reference was made to the Maryland
statute wherein the pleading of limitations against a just
claim upon the estate is left solely within the honesty and
discretion of the administratrix.5 The purpose behind this
type of statute is to put the administrator in the shoes of
the deceased and permit him to plead or waive limitations
against a just claim exactly as the deceased could have
done had he been alive.6 In the majority of states which
have this type of statute, the courts have held that the
administrator's right to waive limitations applies only to
the claims of third persons against the estate and such
waiver is not permitted as to the administrator's own personal claim against the estate in his charge." By such holdSec. 102.
'MD. CoDr (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 105.
'MD. CODE (1951) Art. 93,

"It shall not be considered as the duty of an administrator or execu-

tor, to avail himself of the act of limitations to bar what he supposes
to be a just claim, but the same shall be left to his honesty and

discretion."
'The underlying, legal philosophy supporting such a statute Is well stated
in McGowan v. Miles, 167 Tenn. 554, 72 S. W. 2d 553, 554 (1934), where the
court said:
"The reason that an administrator is permitted to exercise his dis-

cretion about pleading the statute of limitations against a claim of a
third person is that he may know that the debt is a just one, and, the
administrator being bound morally and legally for the protection of

the estate 'and having no interest in the debt sued for, there can be
no reasonable supposition that he will collude with the creditor to
defraud it, and, therefore, it is considered perfectly safe, to let him
rely upon the statute of limitations or not, at his own discretion, as
the deceased himself could have done had he been alive'."
'In Batson v. Murrel, 10 Humph (Tenn.) 301 (1849), it was said that,
although It is safe to let the personal representative use his discretion as
to whether he should waive the statute as to barred claims of creditors,
it is very different when he himself seeks to charge ;the estate with his own
claim which is barred by the statute, as his position is then antagonistic to
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ings, these courts have avoided the conflict of interest
problem since the defense of limitations cannot be waived
against the administrator's own claim should such a defense
be raised by those interested parties disputing such a claim.
The majority of the Maryland Court, in referring to this
statute, merely stated that "[ti his section is not strictly
applicable because the administratrix and the claimant are
the same person, and she is simply not in a position to resist
her own claim on any ground". They then cite in support
of this Semmes v. Young where it was merely held that
since an administrator cannot sue himself, limitations do8
not continue to run while he occupies the dual position.
Hence, the majority was aware of the existence of this conflict of interest, but they failed to provide any remedy to
alleviate such a conflict. Certainly the sisters had a right
to have the claim of the administratrix rest upon the same
footing as that of any other creditor and be barred by limitations which had already run at the date of the administratrix's appointment if the administratrix chose to plead
it.? But, under the ruling of this case, limitations cannot be
raised by those disputing the claim of the administratrix.
Thus, the only available remedy for the sisters would be
to have the issue of the validity of the claim sent to a court
of law, or, should the Orphan's Court allow the widow's
claim, then to appeal to the Court of Appeals. 0 But, in
either event, the statute of limitations obviously would not
be pleaded by the widow against herself, and, thus the
problem of this conflicting interest still remains.
It is a well settled rule in many jurisdictions that the
fact that an administrator or executor claims a personal interest in the assets of his decedent's estate, adverse to or
conflicting with the claims of other persons interested in
such estate, may be grounds for his removal or the revocation of his letters." In many states, in order to avoid this
adverse interest problem, the statutes provide that the
claim of the administrator be submitted to arbitrators or
the estate, and that the other interested parties should then judge as to
the propriety of waiving the statute as to his claim. See also 8 A. L. R.
2d 660.
8
Supra,n. 1, 281; 10 Md. 242 (1856).
9lbid, 247. See MD. CoDm (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 103.
"oSullivan v. Doyle, 193 Md. 421, 429, 67 A. 2d 246 (1949) ; Bell v. Funk,
75 Md. 368, 372, 23 A. 958 (1892).
" See Carpenter v. Planck, 304 Ky. 644, 201 S. W. 2d 908 (1947) ; Price's
Adm'r. v. Price, 291 Ky. 211, 163 S. W. 2d 463 (1942); In Re Guzzetta's
Estate, 97 Cal. App. 2d 169, 217 P. 2d 460 (1950) ; In Re Palm's Estate,
68 Cal. App. 2d 204, 156 P. 2d 62 (1945) ; Raleigh v. Raleigh, 153 Ohio St.
160, 91 N. E. 2d 241 (1950) ; In Re Stauffer's Estate, 57 N. E. 2d 145 (Ohio
1943) ; In Re Koretzky's Estate, 8 N. J. 506, 86 A. 2d 238 (1951).
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that an administrator ad litem be appointed for the sole
purpose of resisting the claim.12 However, in Maryland
there are no such statutes. Instead, "if any creditor, legatee
or next of kin desires to resist passage of such a claim, he
may have issues sent to a court of law, or if the claim has
been passed by the Orphans' Court and his rights are impaired thereby, he may appeal to the Court of Appeals"."3
Normally, this procedure would be sufficient to avoid the
adverse interest problem as to the claim's validity, since
the claim could be litigated in a proper judicial manner
without allowing the administrator to take undue advantage of the contesting party as a result of his fiduciary position. This would necessarily follow in the normal case
since the Court has recognized that an administrator, in
making his claim against the estate, is not acting in his
representative capacity, but is acting in his own individual
capacity. 4 In the usual case, the administrator stands upon
the same footing as any other creditor in regards to his
claim against the estate. But such a procedure does not
put the administrator's claim upon the same footing with
other creditors when limitations are involved, and this
procedure does not avoid the conflicting interest element in
such a case. Thus, in Maryland, there seems to be no way
of eliminating this problem of the adverse interest of the
administrator, when limitations are raised against his claim,
other than to require his removal.
The majority opinion indicated that the Maryland statutes do not provide in express language for the removal of
an administrator where an adverse interest is shown to
exist. This, to a certain extent, is true. However, only
three jurisdictions have statutes in which there is such express terminology. 5 Yet, even in those jurisdictions where
the statutes lack this precise language, the courts have construed the statutes as contemplating that there shall be an
administrator who is suitable to represent the interests involved and then have ruled that an adverse interest is sufficient to render him unsuitable and to require his removal. 6
Furthermore, the language of the Maryland statute could
also be construed to give the Orphan's Court a sufficiently
broad power to grant removal solely because of an adverse
"See 2 WOERNEaR, AMER.ICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3rd Ed. 1923),
Sec. 395.
Sullivan v. Doyle, 8upra, n. 10, 429.
"Hayden v. Stevens, 179 Md. 16, 16 A. 2d 922 (1940).
"41 FLA. STAT. (1955) Ch. 734, §734.11 (10) ; 4 COwP. LAWS MICH. (1948)
§704.48; ANDERSEN'S OH. REV. CODE (1953), Sec. 2113.18.
10Putney v. Fletcher, 148 Mass. 247, 19 N. E. 370 (1889) ; Barnett's Adm'r.
v. Pittman, 282 Ky. 162, 137 S. W. 2d 1098, 1100 (1940).
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interest."' In Carey v. Reed,"s the Court quoted the following passage from Schouler's work on Executors and
Administrators: 19
"'It is perceived that statutes of this character confer upon the Court, and most appropriately too, a broad
discretion as to the various instances which may justify
removal. Whenever, from any cause, the executor or
administrator becomes unable to perform properly the
substantial duties of his office, he may be regarded as
evidently unsuitable'."
and continued:
"The Legislature, by the language of Code Art. 93,
Section 230,20 which declares that: 'The Court shall
have full power * * * to secure the rights of orphans and
legatees, and administer justice in all matters relative
to the affairs of deceased persons', meant to enlarge its
discretion and relieve it of a too narrow construction
of its powers."
Thus, though the Court has previously held that an administrator may be removed only for legal and specific causes,2
it would seem to be within the Court's discretion to determine just what that legal and specific cause shall be.
Furthermore, as the dissenting opinion has pointed out,
the power of the Orphan's Court to remove an administrator solely because of conflicting interests has been recognized by way of dicta in a number of Maryland cases and
may be considered as a sufficient legal and specific cause
justifying removal.2 2
The majority opinion also refers to the Maryland statute's provision that a creditor may administer an estate in
the absence of blood relatives2" as indicating that an adverse interest is not in itself a ground for removal. This
Art. 93, Sec. 254:
"The Court shall have full power to ... secure the rights of orphans
and legatees and administer justice in all matters relating to the affairs
of the deceased persons, . ."
82 Md. 383, 395, 396, 33 A. 633 (1896).
See. 154, fn. 1 of 1910 ed.
10Now MD. CODE (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 254.
21Fulford v. Fulford, 153 Md. 81, 92, 137 A. 487 (1927).
See the following cases discussed in the dissenting opinion of the principal cases, at pages 287 to 290; Owings v. Bates, 9 Gill 463 (1851) ; Cox v.
Chalk, 57 Md. 569 (1882) ; Bates v. Revell, 116 Md. 691, 82 A. 986 (1911) ;
Wingert v. Albert, 127 Md. 80, 95 A. 1055 (1915) ; Haas v. Reimers, 177
Md. 567, 10 A. 2d 705 (1940).
"MD. CODE (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 33: - "If there be no relations administration shall be granted to the largest creditor ... "
.MD. CODE (1951)
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does not necessarily follow. Blood relatives are always
given the preference to administer the decedent's estate
since they would have some interest in conserving the decedent's assets. Certainly they would have a beneficial interest in the estate to the extent that they would be entitled to the residue of the estate after all prior claims are
satisfied. Along these same lines it would seem that, in the
absence of blood relatives, it would be more beneficial to
allow a creditor to administer the estate than it would be
to allow a total stranger to be administrator. At least a
creditor has an interest in conserving the assets of the in24
testate debtor for the purpose of paying his own claim.
So, in this respect, it cannot be said that a creditor's interest in administering the estate is any more adverse than
would be that of a blood relative. As to this creditor's own
claim, issues could always be sent to a court of law should
other interested parties desire to resist it. It is only when
limitations face this creditor's claim that the Maryland procedure fails to eliminate this adverse interest problem, and
in such a case, it would be immaterial whether the administrator pressing his claim was a creditor or a blood relative.
In conclusion, it seems clear that the unavailability of
limitations to the parties resisting the administrator's claim
creates an adverse interest problem. Since, in such a situation, the Maryland procedure is not adequate to eliminate
such a conflict, and in view of the broad discretionary power
given the Orphan's Court by the Maryland statute and of
the practice in the majority of jurisdictions under similar
statutes, it would seem fair to all parties concerned that
such an administrator be removed because of the conflict of
interests and a new one appointed.
LEROY HANDWERGER

Recrimination As Bar To Divorce On Ground Of
Three-Year Voluntary Separation
Matysek v. Matysekl
In this divorce action the wife (appellee) was granted
an absolute divorce on the ground that the parties had
voluntarily lived separate and apart, without cohabitation,
24 Barton v. Tabler, 183 Md. 227, 37 A. 2d 266 (1944).
See also 33 C. J. S.
938, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 41.
1 212 Md. 44, 128 A. 2d 627 (1957), cited in Hughes v. Hughes, ...
Md.
132 A. 2d 119, 120 (1957).

